Age Relaxation Rules for the Initial appointment to Civil Posts has been mentioned here with detail. These rules are according to the 1993 relaxation of Upper Age Limit Rules Vide Islamabad, the 4th November, 1993. S.R.O. 1079(I)/93. These Rules will not be applicable for the appointment to the posts in BPS-17 to be filled through C.S.S. Competitive Examination. In pursuance of rule 12 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, the President is pleased to make the following rules, namely:- Maximum age limit relaxation is as under:-
(i) (a). Candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Buddhist Community, recognized tribes of the Tribal Areas, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas for all posts under the Federal Government of Pakistan 3 years.
(b) Candidates belonging to Sindh (Rural) and Baluchistan for posts in BPS-15 and below under the Federal Government of Pakistan 3 years.
(ii) Released or Retired Officers / personnel of Pakistan Armed Forces 15 years or the number of years actually served in the Armed Forces of Pakistan, whichever is less will be applicable.
(iii) Government servants who have completed two years continuous government service on the closing date for receipt of applications. 10 years, up to the age of 55 years.
(iv) Disabled persons for appointment to posts in BPS-15 and below 10 years.
(v) Widows, son or daughter of a deceased civil servant who dies during service 5 years.
2010 PLC(CS) 364 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT-NWFP
Arts. 25 & 199—Constitutional petition—Civil service—age relaxation –relaxation in upper age limit of educated divorced women—Claim for —Plea of the petitioner lady was that if educated married women were divorced at a later stage and by then they crossed the upper age limit , could not get employment in government Semi government and Autonomous Bodies because no relaxation in upper age limit was provided therefor —Relevant rules regarding age relaxation , had shown that for different classes of persons concession of relaxation in upper age limit was provided, however, no rule/provision existed to the extent that concession i.e. relaxation in upper age limit to the divorced educated women, who after divorce were in dire need of earning bread for themselves and for their kids—Such omission would amount to discriminatory treatment–Not providing rule to grant relaxation in upper age limit to such professionals and highly skilled women was clearly hit by the prohibitory command of Art.25 of the Constitution—High Court observed that immediate steps were required to be taken to appropriately and suitably amend the rules on the subject and experts on the subject would sit together to frame rules for granting such concession in age relaxation to such divorcees, who were highly skilled, professional and well-educated—Constitutional petition was admitted and allowed and federal /Provincial and all the Autonomous Bodies etc. were directed to frame rule granting relaxation in upper age limit to such divorced women, who wanted to join or rejoin service in said Bodies.
2019 SCMR 1021 SUPREME-COURT
S. 26—Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue and Estate Department (Tehsildar, Naib-Tehsildar/Subordinate Revenue Service) Rules, 2008—Patwari, post of—Upper age limit, relaxation in—By way of a notification an amendment was made in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue and Estate Department (Tehsildar, Naib-Tehsildar/ Subordinate Revenue Service) Rules, 2008 (‘the Rules’) and upper age limit for the post of Patwari was extended to 35 years and it was clearly stated that no provision for age relaxation over 35 years would be allowed under any circumstances by any Authority—Held, that age of petitioner at the time of his turn for being appointed as Patwari was beyond maximum upper age limit of 35 years—Court had no power to further relax the upper age limit for that the jurisdiction of the Court was to apply the law and rules as they appeared on the statute book—Vires of law itself had not been challenged by the petitioner, thus, no deviation from the amending notification could be made on any principle of law—Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.
2019 SCMR 1 SUPREME-COURT
Rr. 3(1), 3(7), 4(4) [as it existed before amendment by SRO Nos.275(I)/2017], 17(2)(f) & 17(3)—Pakistan Television Corporation’s Memorandum and Article of Association, Arts. 83, 85, 86, 87 & 95—Companies Act (XIX of 2017), Ss. 153(g), 204(5) & 212—Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)—Human rights case—Chairman and Director, Pakistan Television Corporation (“PTV”)—Appointment, salary and allowances—Legality—Lack of fiduciary behavior—While the office of the Managing Director of PTV remained vacant, that of the Chairman was occupied by person “Q”—Summaries were moved for relaxation of the upper age limit of 65 years for appointment of “Q” and for the approval of an immensely generous salary package for him—On account of complete lack of skill and experience of running a company, PTV, once a profitable institution, experienced a sharp decline both financially and in its reputation as a major player in the electronic media market—Pakistan Television Corporation (“PTV”) was burdened with an exorbitant amount of expenses on account of inefficient and inept manage ment—Business manage ment skills and experience of running a big company were the basic requirements for an MD/Chairman to efficiently run a huge commercial enterprise, such as PTV, but nowhere from the record produced it was evident that the Federal Government considered such criteria while nominating “Q” as a Director of PTV—Post of Director, PTV did not fall within the definition of ‘tenure post’, therefore the conditions and procedure for appointment provided under Cl.(iii) of Sl. No.141 of the Civil Establishment Code (Esta Code) applied to it—Said conditions provided for publishing an advertisement to gauge the talent pool available for such post, filtering and then assessing the best candidates for the post in accordance with the criteria laid down in the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013—Admittedly, in the present case, there was no advertisement for appointment thus there was no consideration of any pool of potentially capable candidates from which “Q” was chosen—Disregard of the procedure laid down in Cl.(iii) of Sl. No.141 of the Civil Establishment Code (Esta Code) by the Federal Government in the present case was meant to benefit a predetermined candidate, “Q”, whose appointment as Director, PTV was illegal as it was made in violation of the prescribed legal criteria and procedure—Meeting of Board of Directors for appointment of Chairman, PTV was held after the notification of appointment of “Q” as Chairman had already been issued and after he had assumed his charge as a Director and Chairman—Appointment of “Q” as Chairman, PTV, was, thus, also illegal—Furthermore remuneration and other benefits/allowances of “Q”, being a Director who also held the additional charge of Chairman, had to be determined by the Directors of PTV in a duly constituted Board meeting, which was absent in the present case—Instead remuneration of Q was determined by the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage in a summary for the Prime Minister, which was seen and approved by the then Minister of Information—Said summary was subsequently approved by the Finance Division and thereafter was seen and approved by the Prime Minister through an approval signed by the then Secretary to the Prime Minister—Besides salary approved for “Q” was also far beyond the salary admissible to MP-I public office holders—Certain unlimited benefits/allowances granted to the office of the Chairman of PTV were not in line with the policy of the ‘best interests of the public sector company’—Despite the fact that PTV had suffered colossal losses during the past few years, “Q” was awarded with a generous salary and exorbitant perks and privileges—Payment of salary and the benefits/allowances to “Q” was unlawful and unauthorized under the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013, and Pakistan Television Corporation’s Memorandum and Article of Association, therefore, he was not entitled to such payments and could not retain the same—While holding office of Director and Chairman, PTV, “Q” also hosted a programme for his own self-promotion and personal aggrandizement by utilizing public money—Furthermore, “Q” breached his fiduciary duties when he hired his own son as a scriptwriter for a drama aired on PTV, used two instead of one official car and got maintenance and running allowances for a third personal car, used PTV funds to pay the membership and subscription fees of a club, incurred exorbitant expenses for renovation of various offices and for entertainment of guests inside and outside the office, and used public funds to attend a book exhibition completely unrelated to his duties as a Director and Chairman of PTV—Minister for Information, Minister for Finance and the then Secretary to the Prime Minister were all responsible for the appointment of “Q” as Director and Chairman of PTV, and for the illegal fixation of his terms and conditions of service—Supreme Court directed that on account of lack of fiduciary behavior, “Q” was ineligible to be appointed as a Director of any company [as per S. 153(g) of the Companies Act, 2017] from date of present judgment; that administrative actions taken by “Q” were beyond the scope of duties of a Chairman as provided in the Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance) Rules, 2013, therefore all such orders passed by him during his tenure were declared to be illegal and void ab initio; that the loss caused to PTV (as calculated by the Supreme Court) due to the appointment of “Q” shall be recovered from “Q”, the then Minister for Information, Minister for Finance and Secretary to the Prime Minister in the ratios 50% (“Q”), 20% (Minister for Information), 20% (Minister for Finance) and 10% (Secretary to the Prime Minister) respectively; that the Federal Government shall appoint a full-time MD of PTV (if the position was still vacant) after fulfilling all legal, procedural and codal formalities, strictly in accordance with law—Human rights case was disposed of accordingly.
2019 PLC(CS) 1014 SUPREME-COURT
S.26—Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue and Estate Department (Tehsildar, Naib-Tehsildar/Subordinate Revenue Service) Rules, 2008—Patwari, post of—Upper age limit, relaxation in—By way of a notification an amendment was made in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue and Estate Department (Tehsildar, Naib-Tehsildar/ Subordinate Revenue Service) Rules, 2008 (‘the Rules’) and upper age limit for the post of Patwari was extended to 35 years and it was clearly stated that no provision for age relaxation over 35 years would be allowed under any circumstances by any Authority—Held, that age of petitioner at the time of his turn for being appointed as Patwari was beyond maximum upper age limit of 35 years—Court had no power to further relax the upper age limit for that the jurisdiction of the Court was to apply the law and rules as they appeared on the statute book—Vires of law itself had not been challenged by the petitioner, thus, no deviation from the amending notification could be made on any principle of law—Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused
2019 PLC(CS) 808 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT
SHAH SAUD versus KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
R. 2(2)—Appointment against the post of Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate—relaxation in upper age limit—Expression “excluded” and “relaxation “—Petitioners-candidates sought relaxation in upper age limit but same was refused by the Public Service Commission on the ground that they had already availed two years relaxation in upper age limit granted by the High Court and they were not entitled to further age relaxation beyond two years already allowed to them—Validity—Candidate for the post of Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate was not entitled to two relaxation s in the upper age limit under R.2(2) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (relaxation of Upper age Limit) Rules, 2008 but a maximum period of two years was to be ‘excluded’ from the upper age limit of every candidate for the post who had practiced at Bar for a period not less than two years—Word ‘excluded’ had different connotation from the word ‘relaxation ‘—Candidate having already availed one relaxation would still be entitled to the benefit of ‘exclusion’ of two years of his practice at the Bar from his/her age under R.2(2) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (relaxation of Upper age Limit) Rules, 2008—Constitutional petitions were allowed in circumstances.
2019 PLC(CS) 380 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT
Appointment against the post of Assistant Sub-Inspectors—Dispute as to age relaxation of candidates—Appointments held in abeyance till the decision about other candidates—Petitioners got relaxation in upper age limit and notification for their appointment was issued—Notification for appointment of petitioners was held in abeyance by the department till the decision of cases of other candidates with regard to age relaxation by the Provincial Government—Validity—Employees in case of violation of terms and conditions of service could not invoke constitutional jurisdiction of High Court—Keeping of appointment notification/order in abeyance did not fall within the purview of “terms and conditions” of service of petitioners and such order was abuse of authority and powers—Department had not dealt the petitioners in accordance with law—If something was wrong on the part of petitioners-employees, they were to be issued charge sheet or explanation letter in accordance with Rules—Authorities could not act in violation of the provisions of Constitution and law of the land—Department had no lawful authority and jurisdiction to hold the notification/order of appointment of employees in abeyance—Impugned order was set aside—Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
2019 MLD 606 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
Dr. NAHEED FATIMA Versus PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIR CORPORATION (PIAC)
Ss. 17, 22 & 25, Schedule-II, Rr. 5(2) & 20—Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855), S. 1—Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117, 120 & 122—Suit for recovery of damage s—Onus to prove—Predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs died in an aircraft crash—Plaintiffs sought recovery of damage s from Airline company on allegations of wilful misconduct, carelessness and negligence—Validity—Onus to prove, non-existence of liability, specially caused on account of accident not having been denied, in presence of language of R. 20 of Sched. II of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 and Art. 122 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, concept of no-fault liability rested with Airline—Under Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966, claimant only had to bring up his/their case and onus of proof in that regard rested with Airline to disprove same—Same would be to extent and what was within prescribed limit of 250,000 Francs as provided in S. 22 of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 where applicable as well as under S. 25 of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 for an ultimate loss, if Airline was not able to prove anything in adversity—Special law did not provide availability to Airline to contest and challenge claim other than as provided under Rule 20 of Sched. II of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 which stand defendant had not preferred to take for obvious reasons—relaxation of limit as provided under S. 25 of Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 was also found available as Airline had neither come up with its own version of accident nor report of Civil Aviation Authority was challenged—Suit was decreed accordingly.
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