Pension

2019-10-10

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Citation Name : 2019 PLC(CS)N 13 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
Side Appellant : ZAKIA SHAUKAT RIZVI
Side Opponent : CONTROLLER MILITARY ACCOUNTS

R. 8(2)(a)(iii)—Second unmarried daughter, entitlement of—Petitioner was second unmarried daughter and her grievance was that Federal Government was not giving pension after waiver by first unmarried daughter—Plea raised by petitioner was that such entitlement was available to family of pensioners in the province of Punjab—Validity—Amendments were incorporated by substituting Pension Rules for Civil Servant’s Family Pension (Federal Government)— Discrimination was cured and pension would be distributed equally amongst surviving unmarried daughter(s)/widow daughter(s)/divorce d daughter(s) till marriage/remarriage—Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.


Citation Name : 2019 PLC(CS)N 26 SUPREME-COURT-AZAD-KASHMIR
Side Appellant : RASHEEDA LATIF
Side Opponent : AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR GOVERNMENT through its Chief Secretary

S. 44—Civil Service—pension ary benefit—Writ petition of an employee for implementation of order passed in an earlier writ petition—Acceptance of terms and conditions of a notification/order—Effect—Petitioner filed writ petition for implementation of order passed in an earlier petition but same was dismissed—Validity—Writ petition was an equitable relief—If a person had accepted terms and conditions of a notification but later on after complying with the order/notification turned round then relief could not be granted in writ jurisdiction—Petitioner had accepted the terms and conditions of impugned notification/order—Employee having acquiesced, could not turn round and claim the pension ary benefits from the years 2000 to 2009—High Court had rightly dismissed the writ petition through impugned judgment—If earlier judgment was not complied with then petitioner should have approached the Court after expiry of the stipulated period—Said judgment had already been implemented in letter and spirit—Second writ petition was filed after the lapse of the period of eight years which was hit by principle of laches—No illegality had been committed by the High Court—Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.


 

Citation Name : 2019 SCMR 734 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : Mian MUHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF
Side Opponent : State


Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)—Corruption and corrupt practices—Suspension of sentence—Admission to bail for a few weeks to allow the convict to seek medical treatment—Petitioner had been convicted by the Accountability Court in respect of offences under Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years along with fine—Medical history of petitioner brought on record did suggest that he had a long history of various ailments including cardiac complications, kidney problems, hypertension and diabetes—After extending due deference to the consistent medical opinion of senior doctors available on record, the prayer made by the petitioner regarding his admission to bail upon suspension of his sentence for a limited period was found to be reasonable—Petitioner was admitted to bail for a period of six weeks upon suspension of his sentence subject to furnishing bail bond in the sum of Rs. Five million with two sureties each in the like amount, with the directions that the petitioner shall not leave or be allowed to leave the country; that bail granted to petitioner shall automatically stand cancelled upon expiry of six weeks whereupon the petitioner shall surrender to custody voluntarily failing which he shall be taken into custody; that surrender to custody shall not include surrendering before a court with an application for bail, and that the petitioner may get himself medically treated from medical practitioners and medical facilities of his choice in the country.

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Citation Name : 2019 SCMR 382 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : NASIR MEHMOOD
Side Opponent : UMAR SAJID

S. 27(2)(i)— Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 63(1)(h)—Disqualifications for candidates—Conviction and sentence for a term not less than ‘two years’—Suspension of sentence—Effect on disqualification—Suspension of the sentence awarded to the candidate would have no consequence on his conviction which was complete as soon as the person charged had been found guilty by a Court of competent jurisdiction—Conviction of the candidate was relevant in the context of Art. 63(1)(h) of the Constitution and S. 27(2)(i) of the Punjab Local Governments Act, 2013 (“Act”)—Suspension of sentence would have no consequence on the conviction of the candidate the purposes of being qualified to contest either the local bodies elections or the elections for the Legislative Assemblies—Unless the conviction was specifically suspended by the Appellate Court by assigning cogent reasons therefor, or the appeal of the candidate was ultimately allowed and his conviction as well as sentence were set aside by the Appellate Court, the conviction of the candidate would continue to hold the field and the disqualification incurred by him, by reason of this conviction, shall remain intact.

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Citation Name : 2019 SCMR 278 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : PAKISTAN AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Side Opponent : PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE


S. 3(6)— Retired pilots of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation—pension —Method of calculation—Last salary drawn—pension of appellants (retired pilots of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation) was initially calculated in accordance with the formula articulated in a Trust Deed of 1980 known as the “PIA PALPA FENA pension Fund”—Subsequently in the year 1981, the Martial Law Regulation No. 52 rescinded the said Trust Deed, and pension benefits were calculated first under a pension scheme of 1982 then under a supplemental trust deed called PFF Rules of 1988 which were followed by Admin Order 34 of 2003 and finally under Admin Order No. 08 of 2004—Appellants who retired in the years 2008, 2009 and 2014 were now seeking calculation of retirement benefits on the basis of Trust Deed of 1980 that stood rescinded in 1981—Admin Order No. 34 of 2003 stated that pension , commutation and gratuity shall be calculated on the basis of the salary frozen on 31.12.2002 without taking into consideration future annual increments thereby resulting in the salary component to become stagnant as its effect was that no matter how much the salary increased after 31.12.2002 the pension was to be calculated on the salary drawn on 31.12.2002—Such anomaly so created was, however, reversed by the Pakistan International Airlines through Circular No.21/2003 issued on 31.07.2003 which provided that future revision in pension shall be linked with last drawn salary—Grievance of appellants that pension was not being calculated on last drawn salary also stood redressed in 2003—Supreme Court held that appellants/retired pilots shall be entitled to the pension on the basis of the last drawn salary which they were getting at the time of their retirement—Appeal was dismissed accordingly.


 

Citation Name : 2019 PLC 112 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : PAKISTAN AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Side Opponent : PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE


S. 3(6)—Retired pilots of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation—pension —Method of calculation—Last salary drawn—pension of appellants (retired pilots of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation) was initially calculated in accordance with the formula articulated in a Trust Deed of 1980 known as the “PIA PALPA FENA pension Fund”—Subsequently in the year 1981, the Martial Law Regulation No. 52 rescinded the said Trust Deed, and pension benefits were calculated first under a pension scheme of 1982 then under a supplemental trust deed called PFF Rules of 1988 which were followed by Admin Order 34 of 2003 and finally under Admin Order No. 08 of 2004—Appellants who retired in the years 2008, 2009 and 2014 were now seeking calculation of retirement benefits on the basis of Trust Deed of 1980 that stood rescinded in 1981—Admin Order No. 34 of 2003 stated that pension , commutation and gratuity shall be calculated on the basis of the salary frozen on 31.12.2002 without taking into consideration future annual increments thereby resulting in the salary component to become stagnant as its effect was that no matter how much the salary increased after 31.12.2002 the pension was to be calculated on the salary drawn on 31.12.2002—Such anomaly so created was, however, reversed by the Pakistan International Airlines through Circular No.21/2003 issued on 31.07.2003 which provided that future revision in pension shall be linked with last drawn salary—Grievance of appellants that pension was not being calculated on last drawn salary also stood redressed in 2003—Supreme Court held that appellants/retired pilots shall be entitled to the pension on the basis of the last drawn salary which they were getting at the time of their retirement—Appeal was dismissed accordingly

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Citation Name : 2019 PLC(CS) 860 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance
Side Opponent : MUHAMMAD SHARIF


Salary and pension , increase in—Increase of Rs.300/- per month in salary and 10% in pension , entitlement to—Prime Minister announced ad hoc relief for the government employees including an increase of Rs.300/- per month in their salaries w.e.f. 01-03-1997 and an increase in the pension by 10% (ten percent)—Such announcement was officialized through Office Memoranda, wherein it was clarified that benefit of an increase in pension was admissible to those Government servants who were retired prior to 01-03-1997—Respondents (government employees), who admittedly retired after 01-03-1997, claimed that they were entitled to 10% increase in the pension after they had already availed the benefit of increase in monthly salary of Rs.300/- while they were in service—Held, that ad hoc relief was extended by the then Prime Minister by granting an increase of Rs.300/- in the salary of government employees and an increase of 10% in the pension of the employees who retired prior to the date 01-03-1997—Relevant Office Memoranda showed that two distinct reliefs were granted, one for the employees in service through increase in salary and the other for retired employees through increase in pension — Retired employees were those who retired prior to 01-03-1997, as had been clarified in one of the Office Memoranda—Ad hoc relief of 10% increase in pension was only admissible to employees who stood retired prior to 01-03-1997—Respondents, thus, could not claim both the benefits; one of increase in the monthly salary by Rs.300/- while in service; and the other of increase in pension after retirement—Cutoff date of 01-03-1997 was critical and had relevance, as it split the employees into two broad categories of in service employees on the cutoff date and retired employees on the cutoff date for the purposes of the ad hoc relief—Extending 10% increase in pension to the employees who were in service on 01-03-1997 went against the scheme of the ad hoc relief as it created an imbalance between the two classes of employees by extending unjust advantage to one class of employees i.e., the in service employees on the cutoff date, who would walk away with two distinct ad hoc reliefs (i.e., increase in salary and increase in pension after retirement) when they had been promised only one.

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Citation Name : 2019 PLC(CS) 384 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
Side Opponent : AHMED ALI BHAMBHRO


Regln. 6(3)— pension ary benefits of transferred employee—Respondent-employee was transferred from Pakistan National Produce Company Limited to the National Insurance Corporation Limited (“the Insurance Corporation”) under an administrative order of the competent authority on the basis that the former company had been wound up—At the time of his retirement, question arose about the pension ary benefits of the respondent for the period he spent in his erstwhile company i.e. Pakistan National Produce Company Limited (PNPCL)—On the refusal of his pension ary benefits, the respondent approached the High Court, which through the impugned order granted him the pension ary benefits for the period for which he had been serving in the erstwhile company—Plea of Insurance Corporation that pension ary benefits were not available to the respondent under the rules of his erstwhile company and besides Regulation No. 6(3) of National Insurance Corporation Employees’ pension Funds Regulation, 1986 prohibited pension ary benefits until and unless expressly and unequivocally granted to an employee—Validity—Respondent was not working in Insurance Corporation on deputation rather in compelling circumstances he had been transferred, therefore, provisions of Regln. 6(3) had no relevance to the present case—Record did not show whether the erstwhile company did not carry a pension scheme, therefore, respondent’s pension ary benefits for the period he had served in the erstwhile company could not be denied—Appeal filed by Insurance Corporation against judgment of High Court was dismissed accordingly.

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Citation Name : 2019 PLC(CS) 67 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : WAPDA through Chairman
Side Opponent : Mst. PARIZADA


R. 6—pension —Entitlement of employee’s widow to pension —Deceased employee was appointed as office chowkidar in appellant-department—Deceased died during service after putting in 9 years and 8 months of service, and after his death, his widow was paid group life insurance and other financial benefits but was denied pension on the ground that he was a work-charge employee—Widow claimed that her husband being chowkidar had died after serving for a period of about 10 years, thus, she was entitled to get pension under pension Rules of the department—Validity—Deceased employee was appointed as chowkidar, which was a permanent post and that was the reason that he had been given annual increments and upon his death, his wife was given all financial benefits including group life insurance etc.—From the nature of job and the period the deceased employee had served, it could not be said that he was a work charge employee, and there was every likelihood that he would have continued to serve had he lived longer—Serial Number 2 of paragraph 2(c)(5) of Volume-II of WAPDA Compendium of Important Directives/Office Orders issued by the Authority clearly provides that “pension as well as commutation (25%) is to be paid, if service is 9-1/2 years or more.”—In the present case, the deceased employee had admittedly put in 9 years and 8 months service, hence, he being on a permanent post until his death, his widow was entitled to receive pension —Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

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Citation Name : 2019 PLC(CS) 55 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : Syeda SAKINA RIAZ
Side Opponent : FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN


S. 26—Employee of University of Karachi—Entitlement of employee’s widow to receive family pension —Minimum qualifying service—Claim of employee’s widow for grant of family pension was denied for the reason that her husband had not put in the minimum qualifying service of ten years as envisaged under S. 26 of the University of Karachi Service pension Statute, 1972—Legality—Right to claim pension was a right connected with the tenure of service which under the applicable pension rules had to be served by an employee in order to make him eligible for pension —Where a deceased employee had put in pension able service, only then his family became entitled to pension —In order to claim pension , a minimum qualifying service was the threshold that had to be first crossed which would then entitle an employee or his family after his death to claim pension —Principle of completing minimum qualifying service was ingrained in every law that granted pension to the employees or after their death to their families—Said principle was based on ‘quid pro quo’, which mandated that an employee must put in minimum qualifying years of service before he became entitled to claim pension ary benefits—In the present case, admittedly the late husband of the appellant (widow) had put in only about five years of service, well short of rendering qualifying length of service to entitle her to family pension or any concession granted towards the quantum of pension —Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

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Citation Name : 2019 PLD 445 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU, ISLAMABAD
Side Opponent : Mian MUHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF


S. 426—National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), S. 9—Judgments of the High Court relating to bail—Short format—Supreme Court deprecated the practice of writing lengthy judgments in bail matters and observed that instead of adhering to the guidelines issued and recommendations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Shakeel v. The State and others (PLD 2014 SC 458) regarding shorter format of orders to be passed in matters of bail, the High Court’s (impugned) judgment relating to bail upon suspension of sentence spanned over 41 pages.

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Citation Name : 2019 PLD 445 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU, ISLAMABAD
Side Opponent : Mian MUHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF


S. 9—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 426—Corruption and corrupt practices—Suspension of sentence—Bail, grant of—Accused and co-accused persons were convicted and sentenced by the Accountability Court—High Court admitted them to bail by suspending their sentences—No allegation had been levelled regarding any misuse or abuse of the concession of bail by the accused or co-accused persons—Accused was already in jail after having been convicted and sentenced in connection with another criminal case, whereas one of the co-accused was a woman and the law envisaged concession for her in the matter of bail—Moreover sentence of imprisonment passed by the Trial Court against the other co-accused was quite short—Supreme Court, in such circumstances, declined to interfere with the jurisdiction and discretion exercised by the High Court in the matter of granting bail to accused and co-accused persons upon suspension of their sentences—Appeals were dismissed in circumstances.

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Citation Name : 2019 PLD 445 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU, ISLAMABAD
Side Opponent : Mian MUHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF


Ss. 426 & 497—Application for bail/suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal—While deciding such an application merits of the case were not to be adverted to or commented upon in any detail.

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Citation Name : 2019 PLD 250 SUPREME-COURT
Side Appellant : NATIONAL ACCUONTABILITY BUREAU
Side Opponent : MURAD ARSHAD


Ss. 9 & 10—Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 426, 497, 498 & 561-A—Offences under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999—Ouster of jurisdiction of Accountability Court to grant bail—Powers of the High Court to grant pre and post-arrest bail/suspension of sentence in its Constitutional jurisdiction—Scope—Jurisdiction of the Accountability Court to grant bail had been expressly ousted in the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (“the Ordinance”), which in turn had burdened all the High Courts with bail applications under Article 199 of the Constitution—Jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution had to be exercised with circumspection and caution as extraordinary jurisdiction was invoked and it should be exercised to advance the cause of justice and not to frustrate it or to defeat the intent of law—Such jurisdiction, therefore, had to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of the Ordinance, and it was not to be used as a substitute of powers under Ss.426, 497, 498 & 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 liberally and indiscriminately converting High Court into a Court of ordinary criminal jurisdiction.